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Article 
The Financial Crisis of 2008–2009: 
Capitalism Didn’t Fail, but the Metaphors 
Got a “C” 
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw† 
  INTRODUCTION   
This panel’s topic within the symposium on the financial 
meltdown of 2008–2009 is the deliciously broad question: “Did 
capitalism fail?” I have taken it as an invitation to ponder not 
the merits and demerits of modern global financial systems, 
but instead to continue my assessment of how those of us who 
are not financial professionals might make sense of them, par-
ticularly when they are in catastrophic mode.1 My thesis is that 
the question itself reveals the extent to which the financial cri-
sis has not been so much about whether an economic system 
succeeds or fails (as Judge Richard Posner has tried to assess 
 
†  Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. A.B. University of 
Michigan; J.D. Stanford University. Thanks to Eric Blumenson, Alan Chil-
dress, Robert Miller, Usha Rodrigues, Michelle Harner, Joe Franco, and Pat 
Shin for helpful criticisms and suggestions. Copyright © 2011 by Jeffrey M. 
Lipshaw. 
 1. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: 
Complexity, Causation, Law, and Judgment, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299, 
305–12 (2010). I am afraid that Professor Robert Miller of Villanova Universi-
ty may have made my point far more succinctly (and understandably) in a 
short essay that was part of another symposium on the financial crisis in 
which I participated: 
There, I think, we touch on a strange truth about human nature. It is 
deeply unnerving for us to think that, even when everyone is behav-
ing rationally and honestly, the result can be catastrophe. . . . Such 
events highlight the limits of the human condition; they remind us 
how limited our cognitive and other powers really are. Hence, when 
something terrible happens, it is much more emotionally satisfying 
for us to identify a villain and hang him from a light post in the town 
square. That way, justice is done, and order is restored to the uni-
verse. We achieve catharsis. 
Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 113, 137 
(2009). 
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in two apocalyptically titled books published since February 
20092), but the meaning we (including Judge Posner) as human 
beings draw from natural and human-made catastrophes.3 
When the world discombobulates our sense of order, our expec-
tations of cause and effect, we seem either to (a) question our 
most fundamental assumptions about science, progress, and so-
cial order, or (b) look for someone to blame.4 
That is, in my view, a reflection of our long and difficult in-
tellectual struggle with the extent to which order and regulari-
ty in nature and human affairs reflect purposes or ends. To 
Aristotle, “final cause” constituted the purpose or ends (the te-
 
 2. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE 
CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) [hereinafter POSNER, 
FAILURE OF CAPITALISM]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST 
DEMOCRACY (2010) [hereinafter POSNER, CRISIS]. I return to Judge Posner’s 
assessment of the crisis later, as I ought, given that his scholarly work over 
the last two years largely constitutes an affirmative answer to the question, 
“did capitalism fail?” See infra notes 51–52, 127–32 and accompanying text. 
 3. For an alternative (and exhaustive) approach to the relationship be-
tween the objective study of markets and the meanings that events in the 
market impart to participants, see generally Robin Paul Malloy, Framing the 
Market: Representations of Meaning and Value in Law, Markets, and Culture, 
51 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2003). Professor Malloy aptly captures the tensions be-
tween aspirations to scientific objectivity (what I discuss here as causation in 
the atelic verb usage) in the analysis of economic events, on one hand, and the 
subjective frames from which human observers interpret and accord signifi-
cance to those events (tending to what I discuss here as causation in the telic 
verb usage), on the other. Id. at 17–18. Our projects, I believe, are similar and 
the approaches sympathetic. Professor Malloy employs Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s work in semiotics, a study based on the concept that “humans are 
sign-making and sign-interpreting beings. Signs, as such, include language as 
spoken and written, visual images, colors, symbols, art, architecture, music, 
and a variety of other ways in which ideas are communicated.” Id. at 14. I em-
ploy Steven Pinker’s recent work on meaning that we can observe in syntax, 
semantics, and metaphor, themselves subsets of the signs within the broader 
field of semiotics. See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: 
LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN NATURE (2007). 
 4. The reflections in this Article grow out of my interest in this last 
point—namely, that a view of causation as the attribution of blame is central 
to “thinking like a lawyer” as that concept has developed in Langdellian legal 
science and legal philosophy. See generally H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORÉ, 
CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). Such a view is fine when the object of the law-
yer’s activity is the attribution of blame or fault, the usual object of litigation, 
but is a real problem in the exercise of judgment in other areas, like counsel-
ing, transactions, policy, and regulation.  
For a sincere attempt to assess without demonization how various classes 
of actors impacted the subprime crisis, see Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Vil-
lains in the Subprime Crisis, and Why It Matters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 323 (2010). 
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los) “for the sake of which” things happen5—the characteristic 
of nature that presents invariable sequences occurring not inci-
dentally or by chance, but for a purpose.6 To Kant, there was no 
a priori reason for assuming that nature, not an intelligent be-
ing, has purposes as humans have them.7 Instead it was part of 
our nature, as minds observing the apparently orderly design of 
the world, to analogize purposiveness in nature from subjective 
human purposes (even though we nevertheless recognize proof 
or disproof of such purposes in nature to be beyond the capabil-
ity of human knowledge).8 
Modern behavioral psychology has systematized our knowl-
edge about the relationship between minds and the world, rec-
ognizing that basic hardwired “frames” cause us to interpret 
data in light of ends or purposes. The noted behavioral psychol-
ogist Dan Ariely observed recently, for example, that multiple 
credit card borrowers regularly pay off small balances even if 
they are being charged higher rates on other cards with larger 
balances.9 “We have this incredible desire to feel we are making 
progress . . . . The satisfaction we get from fewer loans opened 
overwhelms our decision of what is the right thing to do.”10 
Steven Pinker has written extensively about the ways in 
which language provides insight into, among other things, this 
purposive aspect of human nature.11 In this Article, I apply 
some of those insights to reactions to the financial crisis cap-
tured in sentences like “did capitalism fail?” The question itself, 
in syntax and meaning (its semantic content), reveals our am-
bivalent relationship with telos. Pinker builds on the insight 
that verb usage in our language incorporates fundamental hu-
man (rather than physical or scientific) concepts of causation.12 
In other words, our language of causation is built on a human 
scale, evolved out of and shaped by metaphors derived from 
 
 5. Aristotle on Causality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/. 
 6. ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS II, § 8 (W. Charlton trans., 1970). Thus, for ex-
ample, animals grow teeth in regular patterns because such arrangements of 
teeth are good for the purpose or end of promoting the animal’s survival. Id. 
 7. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 152–53 (J.H. Bernard 
trans., MacMillan & Co. 2d ed. 1914) (1790). 
 8. Id.  
 9. Robert Langreth, The Empirical Economist, FORBES, May 10, 2010, 
at 22, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0510/opinions-economics 
-dan-ariely-pscyhology-ideas-opinions.html. 
 10. Id. at 22 (quoting Ariely). 
 11. E.g., PINKER, supra note 3. 
 12. Id. at 228–33. 
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human experience, and has problems in dealing with the very 
small (quantum) and the very big (or very collective). Some 
verb usages convey atelic meaning (i.e., without imputed pur-
poses or ends): things just happen without something purpos-
ively causing something. Some verb usages convey telic mean-
ing (i.e., imputing purpose): the verb is telling us that the 
subject of the sentence did something to the object, and implic-
itly the subject acted with purpose. When we use verbs convey-
ing telic meaning in connection with a particular subject (like 
something as abstract as “capitalism”), we are already suggest-
ing the subject should be thought of as having purposes or 
ends.13 
I will proceed as follows. First, I will parse the question 
“did capitalism fail?” to make it clear why I think it is ambiva-
lent, syntactically, about the telos of the financial crisis. 
Grammatically, is the sentence transitive or intransitive? 
Second, I will tie the ambivalent syntax of the question to its 
equally ambivalent meaning—telic or atelic—in connection 
with the financial crisis itself. In the frame of the atelic meta-
phor, capitalism failed in the sense of getting sick or dying, and 
the real problem was the perception that the professionals did 
not know how to cure the patient. In the frame of the telic met-
aphor, a well-engineered modern society hums along smoothly, 
operated and regulated by well-trained professionals. In that 
case, either the machine or its operators failed our expecta-
tions. I conclude by suggesting that if we understand the source 
of the metaphoric frames themselves, we may not solve the fi-
nancial crisis, but we may be able to calm the troubled waters 
of our fundamental assumptions and our concomitant desire to 
find human or divine villains to blame. 
I.  PARSING THE QUESTION   
A. THE SYNTAX OF “DID CAPITALISM FAIL?” 
The first part of the argument deals with the ambivalent 
syntax of the question “did capitalism fail?” Steven Pinker has 
persuaded me that there is a relationship between parts of 
speech—the place of nouns, verbs, subjects, objects, and predi-
cates in language—and the fundamental concepts by which 
human minds make sense of the world.14 Before getting to 
 
 13. See id. at 219–25; see also discussion infra Part I. 
 14. PINKER, supra note 3, at 24. 
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Pinker’s insights, however, I need to be clear about the gram-
matical structure. The declarative construction of the question 
is: “Capitalism did fail.” The subject of the sentence is the word 
“capitalism.” The verb is the past tense of “to fail” supple-
mented by an auxiliary or helping verb “did,” which serves only 
to set the tense more precisely. 
Let us first clarify the semantic content of the subject of 
the sentence, “capitalism.”15 In the context of this particular fi-
nancial crisis, we are not talking about Adam Smith’s idealized 
capitalism, “the free action of profit-seeking men bound togeth-
er only by the market itself.”16 Nor is it the Marxian caricature 
that “arises only when the owner of the means of production 
and subsistence finds the free worker available, on the market, 
as the seller of his own labour-power.”17 If anything “failed,” it 
is our modern mixed capitalism in which the means of produc-
tion are substantially in private hands but governments inter-
vene to temper the effects of laissez-faire capitalism. Govern-
ments regulate markets in a variety of ways, such as setting 
quality standards for meat, safety standards for automobiles 
and airplanes, and fairness standards for the distribution of 
and trading in securities. Governments actually create mar-
kets, such as establishing profit-making, publicly traded corpo-
rations like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that purchase resi-
dential home mortgages from “mortgage originators.”18 And, 
 
 15. Pinker analyzes nouns in terms of their relationship to our thoughts 
about physical substance and more “vaporous entities,” but that analysis is not 
directly relevant to my discussion here. Id. at 163–74. 
 16. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 35 (4th ed. 1972). 
 17. 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 274 (Ben Fowkes trans., Vintage Books 
1977) (1867). 
 18. Fannie Mae, formerly known as the Federal National Mortgage Asso-
ciation, describes itself as follows: 
  Fannie Mae is a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) char-
tered by Congress with a mission to provide liquidity, stability and af-
fordability to the U.S. housing and mortgage markets. 
  Fannie Mae operates in the U.S. secondary mortgage market. Rath-
er than making home loans directly to consumers, we work with 
mortgage bankers, brokers and other primary mortgage market part-
ners to help ensure they have funds to lend to home buyers at afford-
able rates. We fund our mortgage investments primarily by issuing 
debt securities in the domestic and international capital markets. 
About Fannie Mae, FANNIE MAE, http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page= 
home&c=aboutus (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
Freddie Mac, “one of America’s biggest buyers of home mortgages, is a 
stockholder-owned corporation chartered by Congress in 1970 to keep money 
flowing to mortgage lenders in support of homeownership and rental housing.” 
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perhaps not finally, governments modulate the macroeconomy, 
either by a combination of spending and taxing, or by expand-
ing or restricting the money supply. I have to believe, when we 
panel members are asked the question “did capitalism fail?,” we 
are no longer being asked about the capitalism of Vanderbilt, 
Stanford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie, much less Smith and 
Marx, but this mixed version that has evolved mainly since 
1933.19 
So much for the subject of the sentence. Now we need to 
discuss the verb. There is an interesting syntactical ambiguity, 
and how we come out on the syntax likely impacts the semantic 
import of the sentence. The word play of my title highlights the 
issue: Is the verb “fail” intransitive or transitive? Recall ele-
mentary English grammar. A transitive verb requires a direct 
object. The syntax tells us X is doing something to Y. “Jeff blew 
his nose.” “Suzy sold seashells.” “Suzy sold” is a strange sound-
ing sentence because the transitive verb usage requires an ob-
ject of Suzy’s action: something she sold. An intransitive verb 
appears without a direct object. “Joe slept.” “Mary died.” In-
deed, if we use what is normally an intransitive verb in a tran-
sitive way, we either get something that sounds nonsensical, 
like “Mary died Joe” (instead of the transitive “killed”), or 
something that we accept as emphasizing the action, as in “the 
baby slept the night” (here we have truncated the adverbial 
phrase “through the night” into syntax that sounds like the ba-
by actually did something to the night).  
What about the word “fail”? The dictionary gives both in-
transitive and transitive usages.20 As an intransitive verb, 
“fail” means to fade or die away, to stop functioning, or to be or 
become absent or inadequate.21 What is the significance of the 
intransitive verb? The syntax means that we think of capital-
ism failing as something that simply happens, as in:  
 
About Freddie Mac, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about_ 
freddie.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
 19. Judge Posner, as usual, has a clear explanation of the term: 
[C]apitalism is not a synonym for free markets. It is the name given 
to a complex system with many moving parts. The buying and selling 
and borrowing and other activities carried on in private markets are 
only some of those moving parts. Others include a system of laws for 
protecting private property and facilitating transactions, institutions 
for enforcing those laws, and regulations designed to align private in-
centives with the goal of achieving widespread prosperity. 
POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 20. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 449 (11th ed. 2003). 
 21. Id. 
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(1) “Life evolved.” 
(2) “The universe expanded.” 
(3) “Climate changed.” 
(4) “Johnny grew.” 
(5) “Obama won.” 
(6) “Eliot Spitzer imploded.” 
(7) “Capitalism failed.”22 
 
If we ask the question “did capitalism fail?” intransitively, we 
are asking whether it got sick or died.  
The verb “fail” also has a transitive usage. Here, “fail” 
means to disappoint the expectations of someone or something 
(“Joe failed Mary in her time of need”), or to miss performing 
an expected service or function for someone (“My legal educa-
tion failed me in my search for a job”).23 If we ask the question 
transitively, we are asking whether capitalism disappointed us, 
blew the test, failed our expectations.24 
Now we can proceed to Pinker’s insights. 
B. THE SEMANTICS OF “DID CAPITALISM FAIL?”: AGONIST OR 
ANTAGONIST IN THE FORCE DYNAMICS MATRIX? 
Pinker’s contention is that language of causation reveals a 
human proclivity to import purposiveness and intentionality 
into causation.25 This is so even when we would immediately 
agree with the proposition that nature has no such human-like 
intention. Consider these sentences that employ transitive verb 
usages: “Nature abhors a vacuum.” “The system seeks equilib-
rium.” We (or I at least) do not believe nature abhors vacuums 
the way I abhor hearing iPod music coming from the head-
phones of the person sitting next to me on the subway. Nor do I 
believe a system is seeking equilibrium in the same way I am 
 
 22. These are examples of nonpurposive intransitive usages. There can, 
however, be purposive intransitive usages where the subjects are volitional 
agents, like “Mary jumped” or “Plato philosophized,” but as discussed infra 
note 46, my concern here is the possibility that our language permits attribu-
tion of purpose and intention to events not initiated by a volitional agent. 
 23. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 449. 
 24. It may seem odd to think of “capitalism” as a subject that is capable of 
failing a test, but that is semantic and not syntactical. There are verb con-
structions that make perfect sense in which capitalism is the subject and does 
something to someone: “Capitalism gave us one hundred years of prosperity.” 
In this sentence, “capitalism” is the subject, “one hundred years of prosperity” 
is the direct object, and “us” is the indirect object.  
 25. PINKER, supra note 3, at 153–63. 
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seeking peace and quiet or my dog is seeking a comfortable po-
sition on the sofa.  
Thus Pinker attempts to reconcile the syntax and seman-
tics of intentionality in causation (what he calls the “oomph” of 
our causal intuitions) with the more deterministic and scientific 
concepts of causation.26 Two common philosophical propositions 
about causation, for example, are constant conjunction and 
counterfactuals. Hume’s view was the classic statement of the 
first proposition.27 There is no “metaphysical” causation: what 
we see as “cause and effect” is merely an expectation based on 
the constant repeated conjunction of events. There is no neces-
sary reason the billiard ball moves in a certain direction after 
being struck; it just always does, and we expect it always will. 
In the counterfactual conception, “A caused B” means B would 
not have happened but for the occurrence of A. The problem 
Pinker points out is that we do not experience counterfactual 
worlds, and they can be anything; counterfactual causation 
taken to its logical extreme counts too much as causation.28  
An example might involve a Type I diabetic diagnosed in 
childhood who, as an adult, commits a murder. Frederick Ban-
ting and Charles Best first isolated insulin and purified it for 
use in the treatment of Type I diabetes, which until then was a 
terminal disease.29 Under counterfactual causation, this dis-
covery (A) caused the murder (B) because the murder would not 
have happened but for the discovery of insulin (the murderer 
would have died in childhood). Pinker thus notes a moderating 
amendment to the counterfactual theory: we make sense of 
counterfactual causation by only invoking possible worlds that 
are “close” to our own.30 Indeed, that is what we do when we 
control the variables in an experiment to determine causation 
rather than mere correlation.31 
Causation in the natural and social sciences remains the 
subject of philosophical debate. Pinker’s approach is slightly 
different. He contends language reveals, if not an answer to the 
philosophical conundrum, then at least an insight into human 
 
 26. Id. at 218. 
 27. Id. at 157. 
 28. Id. at 211–15. 
 29. Lilly History, ELI LILLY & CO., http://www.lilly.com/about/history/ (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
 30. See PINKER, supra note 3, at 213. 
 31. Id. 
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intuitions about causation.32 I want to explore that insight in 
the context of the question “did capitalism fail?” Put otherwise, 
I find ridiculous the following proposition about nature: “The 
earthquake punished Haiti because its people practiced voo-
doo.” The syntax and the semantics here are starkly consistent 
with a meaning that the earthquake (or God) actually had a 
human-like intention, and I reject it. I am far less troubled syn-
tactically or semantically by this: “When the levee broke, the 
floodwaters in New Orleans sought the level of Lake Pontchar-
train.” The syntax suggests intentionality on the part of the 
water, but I do not, when I think about it, actually believe the 
water had a mind. But when somebody says to me not “capital-
ism died” but “capitalism failed us,” I do wonder about the rela-
tionship of syntax and meaning. That is, causation in the natu-
ral world and human views of causation are different, but they 
are nevertheless inextricably linked, particularly when we are 
talking not about a discrete, observable physical system, but a 
conceptual scheme (like “capitalism” or “academia”) that is the 
creation of the observers themselves.33 
Pinker begins with the word usages that convey the mean-
ing of causation: verbs.34 Verbs express the state of something, 
whether something, namely the subject, exists, acts, or oc-
curs.35 Verbs like “bring,” “make,” “cause,” and “force” express a 
kind of pure causation. The subject acts on the object, as in “the 
earthquake caused the tsunami.” Other verbs express causa-
tion but their meanings import a particular kind of effect, as in 
“the wind dried the sheets” or “Fred shook his fist.” Other verbs 
express concepts like prevention, as in “the glare impaired my 
vision.” Some verbs express enabling, as in “Mary helped me.”36 
 
 32. The legal analog to the moderating amendment in counterfactual cau-
sation is “but for” causation versus “proximate” causation. See HART & 
HONORÉ, supra note 4, at 95–96. In my view, this is simply a subset of Pink-
er’s broader point: language reveals a human intuition about causation and, 
not surprisingly, law’s language does so as well. 
 33. See Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth, Ghosts and the Machine: Is-
sues of Agency, Rationality, and Scientific Methodology in Contemporary Phi-
losophy of Social Science, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1, 11–13 (Stephen P. Turner & Paul A. Roth eds., 2003).  
 34. PINKER, supra note 3, at 25–87. 
 35. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1389 
(“[A verb is] a word that characteristically is the grammatical center of a pred-
icate and expresses an act, occurrence, or mode of being . . . .”). A predicate is 
“the part of a sentence or clause that expresses what is said of the subject and 
that usually consists of a verb with or without objects, complements, or adver-
bial modifiers.” Id. at 978. 
 36. PINKER, supra note 3, at 219. 
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The primary insight on the human intuition about causa-
tion comes from an application of the linguist Len Talmy’s 
“force dynamics” matrix to those verbs.37 According to Talmy 
(by way of Pinker), most of the world’s languages capture caus-
al intuitions by way of a pattern involving the relationship of 
agonists and antagonists.38 (We will return shortly to the ques-
tion of whether “capitalism” is an agonist or an antagonist in 
the sentence under discussion.) The agonist is an entity with an 
intrinsic tendency to motion or rest.39 The antagonist is an en-
tity that exerts a force on the agonist, usually counter to the 
tendency of the agonist.40 The matrix distinguishes among verb 
usages based on whether humans are inclined to see purposes 
or ends in the relationship between agonist and antagonist be-
ing expressed by the verb that connects them.41 
In atelic settings (i.e., those in which we do not intuit pur-
pose or intention), the observer is “dropping in on a situation 
that is already in progress.”42 What makes it atelic is that the 
sentence means “W is occurring” rather than “Y does something 
to Z.” In the sentence “W is occurring,” W is the agonist. Ago-
nists, according to the Talmy matrix, have a tendency to move 
or be at rest, and can be either moving or resting on account of 
their relationship with an antagonist that was already present 
when we dropped in to observe.43 The matrix thus gives us 
these atelic possibilities, which are expressed in intransitive 
verb usages: 
 
Causation. When the agonist has a tendency to rest, but it moves on 
account of the antagonist, we intuit causation, as in “the earth re-
volves around the sun because of the sun’s gravitational pull.” The 
earth is W, the agonist. It would not move but for the pull of the sun, 
the antagonist. 
 
Prevention. When the agonist has a tendency to move, but it rests on 
account of the antagonist, we intuit prevention, as in “the car stayed 
parked on Nob Hill because the wheels hit the curb.” Now the car is 
 
 37. Id. at 219–25. 
 38. Id. at 219. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 220. 
 43. Id. at 220–21. 
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W, the agonist. It would move, but for the resistance of the curb, the 
antagonist.44 
 
The intransitive usage (and atelic meaning) as in “capital-
ism got sick” or “capitalism died” comes naturally, at least to a 
modern social scientific sensibility. “Capitalism” is an agonist. 
It is a process, or a system, that simply moves. How or why it 
moves may or may not be explicable (say, by virtue of the invis-
ible hand of self-interest). In the Pinker-Talmy allusion, we 
have simply dropped in to find it moving.45 Antagonists, like 
regulators, may get in its way or not (for better or worse, de-
pending on one’s political orientation), as the case may be.  
Moreover, causation-inferring sentences in the atelic set-
ting are entirely sensible without the inference of purposes or 
ends in the form of human-like intentions. It may well be that 
Smith thought there was a divine purpose underlying the invis-
ible hand, or others see animism in the forces of nature, but we 
are entirely capable of making sense of the intransitive con-
struction of “capitalism did fail” without such purposiveness.46 
The alternative force dynamics matrix is in a telic setting. 
Here the agonist still has a tendency to move or to rest, but the 
 
 44. The other two possibilities in the matrix involve the concept of “de-
spite.” The agonist either has a tendency to move or to rest and, in each case, 
does so despite the opposition of the antagonist. An example of the first is “the 
Omaha Beach invasion pushed forward despite fierce German resistance.” An 
example of the second is “the goal posts stood despite the push of the crowd 
against them.” 
 45. PINKER, supra note 3, at 220. 
 46. My colleague, Pat Shin, notes that there are intransitive but telic 
usages like “Mary jumped” or “Plato philosophized.” I agree. While all verb 
usages that are semantically atelic would seem to be intransitive grammatically, 
there are intransitive verbs that convey purposiveness. Talmy addresses this 
in his discussion of force dynamics. He contends that force dynamics are built 
into language structure, and hence structure reasoning about causal concepts 
across a broad range of fields, including the physical, social, and psychological 
domains. 1 LEN TALMY, TOWARD A COGNITIVE SEMANTICS 410 (2000). As Tal-
my notes, he deliberately uses (as does Pinker) nonsentient examples, because  
the inclusion of an agent in a sentence, though often yielding a syn-
tactically simpler construction, actually involves an additional semantic 
complex. An agent that intends the occurrence of a particular physical 
event, say a vase’s breaking, is necessarily involved in initiating a 
causal sequence leading to that event. The sequence must begin with 
a volitional act by the agent to move certain parts or all of his body. 
Id. at 421. The syntactical causal structures, in other words, are clearer when 
the agonists and antagonists are not volitional agents. The point is to demon-
strate how human language structures causal concepts even in the physical 
domain, not to suggest that a human being cannot intend an action that might 
be expressed by an intransitive verb. 
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antagonist appears rather than having always been there (at 
least to our observation), and the agonist either moves or rests 
on account of its relationship with the newly appeared antago-
nist. In “Y does something to Z,” Z is the agonist and Y is the 
antagonist. This matrix gives us telic possibilities, which are 
expressed in transitive verb usages: 
 
Causation. When the agonist has a tendency to rest, but it starts on 
account of the antagonist, we intuit causation, as in “the limb’s falling 
on it caused the windshield to break” or “the dog jumping on it made 
the chair collapse.” The windshield or the chair is Z, the agonist. The 
subject doing something to Z is the limb or the dog—in other words, 
Y, the antagonist. 
 
Prevention. When the agonist has a tendency to move, but it stops on 
account of the antagonist, we intuit prevention or blocking, as in “the 
pain in her knees made the marathoner stop at mile twenty-two.” 
Here the marathoner is Z, the agonist. The pain in her knees is Y, the 
antagonist. 
 
Pinker observes that telic meanings in these transitive 
verb constructions are “awkward” because they are meant to 
demonstrate the relationship of events to events.47 In the first 
example, the limb did not just happen to fall; something must 
have acted on it. Pinker notes, however, that “everyday lan-
guage glosses over this. An autonomous force, like the wind, 
waves, or fire, or a person exerting free will, appears as the 
subject of a predicate, and the predicate expresses the final 
event in the causal chain, with the intervening links left un-
spoken.”48 Hence the sentence about the limb is particularly 
stilted; the one about the dog less so; and the dog sentence 
would be even more natural if it said, “the dog collapsed the 
chair.” This, as Pinker observes, is because causal language can 
be compressed: “[W]hen an antagonist acts directly on the 
agonist, the act and effect [are both expressed in the ‘causation 
 
 47. PINKER, supra note 3, at 221.  
 48. Id. As in the atelic matrix, the telic matrix has two other possibilities, 
but these involve the concept of “permit.” When the agonist has a tendency to 
rest, and stops even in the face of the antagonist, we intuit “permit,” as in 
“Mom’s quieting the dogs let her son sleep.” Son is Z, the agonist. Mom’s action 
is Y, the antagonist. Son was going to keep sleeping, and Mom’s action permit-
ted that to continue. When the agonist has a tendency to move, and starts 
even in the face of the antagonist, we intuit “permit,” as in “the failure of the 
levee let the lake flood the city.” The water is Z, the agonist; it wants to find a 
certain level. The event constituting the failure of the levee is the antagonist, 
Y; the occurrence of the event permitted the water to do what it “wanted.” 
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plus effect’ verb described above].”49 Moreover, in the prototype 
of causal verbs, “language’s most concise causative construc-
tion,” the antagonist “directly and intentionally caus[es] a pas-
sive agonist to change from its intrinsic state.”50 
The transitive grammatical construction (and telic mean-
ing) of “capitalism did fail,” as in “capitalism failed us,” or “cap-
italism failed our expectations,” seems to me to be more trou-
bling because now we or our expectations are agonists, and 
capitalism is the antagonist that did something (or not) to us. I 
could propose variations on this theme:  
“In the state of nature we were happy, and capitalism made us un-
happy.”  
“Under laissez-faire capitalism, we were happy, but mixed capitalism 
made us unhappy.”  
“Mixed capitalism of the kind in place until George Bush got his 
hands on it made us happy, but deregulation and a return to laissez-
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. I need to be clear that Pinker substantially abridges Talmy’s ex-
ceedingly complex work, which proposes at length generalizations about the 
way grammar reflects force dynamics (Chapter 7, “Force Dynamics in Lan-
guage and Cognition”), and the semantics of causative sentences (Chapter 8, 
“The Semantics of Causation”). TALMY, supra note 46, at 409–549. I have 
simply tried to inform this panel’s topic with Pinker’s insights on Talmy’s 
treatment of the intersection of syntax, semantics, and causation. Talmy’s ac-
tual classification of causative relationships in human language involves, 
among other things, distinctions between volitional or nonvolitional subjects, 
alternative transitive or intransitive verb usages, alternative syntax involving 
stress on agonists and antagonists, and the role of the meanings of the nouns 
and verbs involved.  
For example, Pat Shin and I had an extended discussion of the sentence 
“Mary hears a birdsong.” Pat thought that this might be a transitive sentence 
with an atelic meaning. My reaction was that this might be akin to the force 
dynamic of a sentence like “the earth basked in the sun’s rays.” Those could be 
restated as “the bird’s singing caused Mary to hear it” or “the sun’s rays 
caused the earth to bask.” Those would be atelic situations, with the song or 
the rays as agonists (i.e., songs and rays have a tendency to move) and people 
and planets, respectively, as antagonists (they impede the movement of the 
songs and rays). We simply drop in to observe this all happening.  
Talmy has an extended discussion in Chapter 8 of this kind of relationship 
and would answer Pat’s concern this way. Talmy would refer to Mary as an 
“Undergoer” and the sentence as one not really reflecting a causative relation-
ship:  
While an Undergoer . . . does not intend the event mentioned, she also 
has not undertaken actions that culminate in the event. . . . In other 
words, it impinges on the personal state—that is, affects the subjec-
tive state—of a sentient entity. Although the construction involved is 
considered here because of its look-alike mistakability, it is not really 
interpreted as a causative at all. 
Id. at 517. 
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faire unleashed Wall Street’s greed, and ended up making us unhap-
py.”  
If this seems like a stretch, note that by early 2009 Judge 
Posner had already published The Failure of Capitalism,51 and 
a year later in The Crisis of Capitalist Democracy, he noted 
that the “title alarmed some readers, who thought I meant that 
capitalism has failed us and we need something different.”52  
The point here is that the discussion, both in the sympo-
sium and in public discourse generally, is ambivalently atelic 
and telic, with different entities, some volitional beings and 
some not—us, the economic system known as capitalism, Wall 
Street, the Federal Reserve, mortgage originators, Fannie Mae, 
and so on—sometimes playing the role of agonist and some-
times antagonist. That it was not really capitalism that failed 
us (instead it was many of the actors within the system) was 
Judge Posner’s point even in the first book, though his readers’ 
reaction to the title was some evidence of the proposition that 
the verb “fail” in this context is indeed transitive. Our first in-
clination may be that we could not possibly believe that capital-
ism is an antagonist with purposive and rational intentions, 
and thus capable of being the subject in a sentence with telic 
meaning, even if the sentence is transitive like “capitalism 
harmed us.” Despite our progress, I suggest, we are not always 
that modern. Instead, we are still ambivalent about purposes in 
nature and human affairs, and in times of crisis, we hearken 
back to a more satisfying telos, one that finds intentionality in 
humans, gods, or demons. 
C. USAGE AND MEANING SUMMARIZED 
I summarize this comparison of transitive versus intransi-
tive usage, as well as telic versus atelic meaning, in Figure 1. 
Above the line is a series of intransitive sentences, beginning 
with “Capitalism failed,” whose meanings are increasingly atel-
ic. Below the line is a series of transitive sentences, beginning 
with “Capitalism failed us,” whose meanings are increasingly 
telic. Part II addresses two issues. First, is there something to 
the idea that the intransitive usage in “Capitalism failed” 
evokes the metaphor of “Grandmother weakened,” on one hand 
and that the transitive usage in “Capitalism failed us” evokes 
the metaphor of “Father ruined us.” Second, if so, what is the 
implication? 
 
 51. POSNER, FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, supra note 2. 
 52. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 1. 
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II.  THE TELOS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS   
In this Part, I tie the verb usages addressed in Part I to the 
interaction of physical and human nature that reveals itself in 
the imputation of telos to both. In other words, the structure of 
our language of causation is intricately bound up with our con-
cepts of causation, the semantic content of the proposition. I 
think the financial crisis is as much about the transitive usage 
(what the system failed to do as against our expectations) as it 
is about the intransitive usage (a system either dying and or 
needing emergency life support). The ambiguous meaning, ei-
ther telic or atelic or both, is an insight into the aspect of hu-
man nature that resists purposelessness, even in abstract so-
cial systems like capitalism. In short, the question “did 
capitalism fail?” invokes explanatory metaphors that may not 
fail, but on the other hand, may have deserved no more than a 
C grade. A better insight into human nature may lie in the 
complexity of our language and thought that permits the 
grammatical and semantic ambiguity of the question. While we 
aspire to science, we are not beyond invoking gods and demons, 
whether human or divine (and not beyond hoping for a deus ex 
machina to rescue us). 
My argument in this section proceeds in four parts. First, I 
adopt, for purposes of this Article, a still controversial and de-
bated view of metaphor as “not simply an ornamental aspect of 
language, but a fundamental scheme by which people concep-
tualize the world and their own activities.”53 How we see cause 
and effect is a matter of the framing metaphor we employ in 
the analysis. 
 
 53. Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Metaphor and Thought: The State of the Art, 
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 3, 3 (Raymond W. 
Gibbs, Jr. ed., 2008). 
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Second, the atelic meaning of “capitalism failed,” while 
consistent with modern notions of purposelessness in nature, 
nevertheless evokes an implicit metaphor about human limita-
tions in the face of natural catastrophe. I recall my father de-
scribing my grandmother’s physical condition near the end of 
her life as “she is failing.” In this usage, “failing” equals “dy-
ing,” as in “capitalism is dying” and we seem to have been in-
capable of preventing it, or “capitalism got sick” and we seem to 
have not known how to cure it. The metaphor is to other cata-
strophic forces, like earthquakes or tsunamis or asteroids on a 
collision course with the earth. In our modernity, we have come 
to terms with many atelic realities, at least in the abstract or 
long term: the sun rises and sets, seasons pass, we grow old 
and die, and the sun will turn into a red giant and envelope the 
earth in billions of years. But even though we are modern 
enough to know not to blame the asteroid for what it is going to 
do, many of us, nevertheless, try to reconcile its purposeless-
ness with our own desire for meaning (purpose), particularly in 
desperate times. 
Third, uncovering the implicit metaphor of the verb con-
struction “capitalism failed us” takes a little more work. One 
approach is to find real human purposiveness to which we 
might attribute blame. The other is to understand the persist-
ence of teleology even in sophisticated social science; the result 
of which “capitalism failed us” becomes a metaphor for the ma-
chine and its operators who failed to do their respective jobs. 
Finally, asking the question “did capitalism fail?” provides 
an opportunity to reflect on the metaphors it evokes, and to dis-
card the ones that are not constructive. 
A. METAPHOR THEORY APPLIED TO CAUSATION 
The claim that metaphors have semantic content (i.e., real 
meaning) is not without controversy. Pinker’s assessment of 
metaphor is sensible. He rejects both of the polar positions.54 
Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty famously asserted that 
metaphors carry no meaning beyond the literal statement.55 On 
this account, language divides into semantics, which is mean-
ing, and pragmatics, which are the flourishes and filigrees by 
which speakers draw attention to their literal utterances. Thus, 
 
 54. PINKER, supra note 3, at 235–78. 
 55. See generally RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 
(1989); Donald Davidson, What Metaphors Mean, 5 CRITICAL INQUIRY 31 
(1978).  
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Romeo’s statement “Juliet is the sun” does not really convey 
meaning about Juliet, but “is like using italics, or illustrations, 
or odd punctuation or formats.”56 At the other extreme, George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson assert that all thought derives from 
metaphors that our brains developed from the fact of their be-
ing embodied in human beings.57 On this account, there are no 
transcendent or universal concepts, nor is there any truly ab-
stract reasoning; instead, minds, reason, and thought are 
“shaped crucially by the peculiarities of our human bodies, by 
the remarkable details of the neural structure of our brains, 
and by the specifics of our everyday functioning in the world.”58 
Pinker calls the Davidson-Rorty position the “killjoy 
theory” of metaphor, and I agree.59 It is true that some meta-
phors are dead, in the sense that we use them with absolutely 
no recognition of the fact that they are metaphors. (Pinker’s ex-
ample is the phrase “coming to a head” which alludes to the ac-
cumulation of pus in a pimple.)60 But all metaphors were once 
new and fresh, and some continue to be. Moreover, metaphors 
are a fundamental source of learning and understanding: they 
are “tools of inference that can be carried over from the physical 
to the nonphysical realms, where they can do real work.”61 Met-
aphor in science is a “way of adapting language to reality, not 
the other way around, and . . . it can capture genuine laws in 
the world, not just project comfortable images onto it.”62 
 
 56. RORTY, supra note 55, at 18; see also Davidson, supra note 55, at 31–
32. For a summary of the deflationary accounts of metaphor and a response, 
see Mark Johnson, Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 53, at 39, 39–52. 
 57. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE 
EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 4 (1999). 
 58. Id. For a summary of Lakoff ’s updated neural theory of language, 
which postdates his work with Johnson, see George Lakoff, The Neural Theory 
of Metaphor, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, su-
pra note 53, at 17, 17–38. 
 59. PINKER, supra note 3, at 238–41.  
 60. Id. at 238; see also Susan Haack, The Growth of Meaning and the Lim-
its of Formalism: In Science, In Law, 29 ANÁLISIS FILISÓFICO 5, 6 (2009) (dis-
cussing the life cycle of metaphors as part of the process by which “organic, 
living” languages “shift, change, and adapt”). 
 61. PINKER, supra note 3, at 252. 
 62. Id. at 259; see also Haack, supra note 60, at 11–18. I do not suggest 
that Professor Haack supports any variation of the metaphor theory. She 
simply rejects the twentieth-century commonplace view that “what makes 
science rational must be explicable exclusively in narrowly logical, i.e., formal, 
syntactically characterizable, terms.” Id. at 12. Instead, science progresses by 
way of hypotheses whose vocabulary links the syntax of the hypothetical lan-
guage to the reality it seeks to describe:  
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Metaphors may not be the end-all of human thought, but 
they are indeed powerful in shaping how we approach new is-
sues (like financial catastrophes). Says Pinker: 
The human mind comes equipped with an ability to penetrate the 
cladding of sensory appearance and discern the abstract construction 
underneath—not always on demand, and not infallibly, but often 
enough and insightfully enough to shape the human condition. Our 
powers of analogy allow us to apply ancient neural structures to new-
found subject matter, to discover hidden laws and systems in nature, 
and not least, to amplify the expressive power of language itself.63 
How might those powers of analogy actually work in the attri-
bution of cause and effect? The metaphor theorists have some-
thing to add to the discussion, even if we, like Pinker, do not 
accept all of their conclusions.64 
The Lakoff-Johnson version of metaphor theory challenges 
the traditional view of causation as unduly literal, objective, 
and limited in time. Western philosophers alleged that causes 
were either “literal entities or forces in the world” and had 
something to do with the relationship of physical events, or 
metaphysical forces that had something to do with the ability of 
agents freely to initiate events in the physical world.65 Lakoff 
and Johnson contend otherwise.66 Causation is not a literal 
force in the world. Rather, causal terms are the result of com-
 
This vocabulary-dependence is one reason why science cannot be un-
derstood in exclusively formal-logical terms—not that logic has no 
role, but it is at most part of the story. It also suggests why scientists 
constantly shift and adjust the language of their field, introducing 
new terminology and/or subtly adapting the meaning of older terms: 
they are working towards a vocabulary that better aligns with the 
real kinds of thing or stuff. 
Id. at 13 (footnotes omitted). 
 63. PINKER, supra note 3, at 276. 
 64. Pinker rejects what he calls Lakoff ’s messiah theory of metaphor. Id. 
at 245–51. Pinker remains open to the possibility that there are transcendent 
or universal truths that arise other than by metaphors of embodied physical 
experience, and that ideas are something more than merely rival metaphoric 
frames. Id. at 259. This is because “[c]onceptual metaphors can be learned and 
used only if they are analyzed into more abstract elements like ‘cause,’ ‘goal,’ 
and ‘change,’ which make up the real currency of thought.” Id. This is consis-
tent with Pinker’s view that there are indeed Kantian categories that precede 
experience and that are “the mind’s supports for negotiating reality.” Id. at 
158. I am wholly sympathetic with this latter view (i.e., my intuition is that 
there are some universal and nonembodied concepts), but for purposes of this 
Article, I only need to establish that metaphors, blending (the creation of new 
meaning out of the integration of two apparently unrelated concepts), and ri-
val frames matter, i.e., rejecting the killjoy position. 
 65. Johnson, supra note 56, at 40. 
 66. Id. at 39–52. 
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plex mapping taking place within the human mind, applying 
the experience of physical space or motion metaphorically to 
create abstract connections between events. Moreover, there 
are many schemata employed in such mappings, and thus 
many metaphors for causation in science (or in ordinary expe-
rience).67 These schemata include fundamental physical events 
like the change of the state of an object or movement down a 
path.68  
Thus, the very complexity and elusiveness of causation as 
either physical fact or conceptual mapping, as well as the per-
sistence of teleological purposiveness, even in physical science 
(as discussed below), persuade me that metaphor theory helps 
explain our minds’ ability to be at once scientifically dispassion-
ate and morally blame seeking.69 It may simply depend on 
which metaphor we are using to frame the particular physical- 
or social-science causation issue under review. The behavior 
psychology pioneers Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman char-
acterized a decision frame as “the decision-maker’s conception 
of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a par-
ticular choice,”70 and proposed that decision frames are “con-
trolled partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by 
the norms, habits, and personal characteristics of the decision-
maker.”71 I see no reason why this phenomenon should not af-
fect metaphoric or analogical thinking on causation, even in 
science. 
Here are examples of metaphoric framing in scientific in-
quiry and policy debates. One of my pastimes is to watch lec-
tures on physics for nonscientists while I am exercising on the 
elliptical machine. In one, Professor Steven Pollock of the Uni-
versity of Colorado, explaining particle physics, observed: “We 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. Lakoff and Johnson claim to have mapped nearly twenty different 
metaphors, and posit that several of them are used within different sciences. 
Interestingly, the closest Johnson comes to a concession to Pinker’s Kantian 
critique is the statement, “[t]here appears to be what we called a ‘literal skele-
ton’ shared by all causation concepts [NB: metaphors], namely that a cause is 
a determining factor in a situation.” Id. at 43; see supra note 64 and accompa-
nying text (describing Pinker’s Kantian critique). 
 69. Johnson, supra note 56, at 44–46. 
 70. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981). 
 71. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 
69–70 (1993) (citing Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 70); see also Malloy, 
supra note 3, at 20–25 (discussing how framing devices affect the exchange 
process). 
  
2011] CAPITALISM AND METAPHORS 1551 
 
can think of the universe as being made up of little teeny ob-
jects, almost like little billiard balls. . . . [S]ometimes it’s ok to 
think of electrons as little billiard balls and sometimes it’s just 
inappropriate.”72 Thinking about electrons as billiard balls 
gives them a meaning by analogy to other things, and we base 
our view of the coherence of the explanation (not its rightness 
or wrongness) on how it compares to other explanations we al-
ready view as coherent.  
Another example of framing comes from a scene in one of 
my favorite books, Isaac Asimov’s Fantastic Voyage.73 A ship 
and its crew are miniaturized so they can travel through a 
man’s bloodstream and destroy a life-threatening blood clot 
from the inside. One peril leads to another and they are travel-
ing through a lymph node where they witness antibodies de-
stroying a bacterium. Cora and Michaels are both scientists 
witnessing the antibodies and have the following exchange: 
Cora said excitedly, “You can see them cluster. How . . . how horrible.” 
“Are you sorry for the bacteria, Cora?” said Michaels, smiling. 
“No, but the antibodies seem so vicious, the way they pounce.” 
Michaels said, “Don’t give them human emotions. They are only mole-
cules moving blindly. Inter-atomic forces pull them against those por-
tions of the wall which they fit and hold them there. It’s analogous to 
the clank of a magnet against an iron bar. Would you say the magnet 
attacks the iron viciously?”74 
Finally, the recent contretemps over the involvement of 
Goldman Sachs in structuring synthetic collateralized debt ob-
ligations (CDOs)75 is, in my view, a debate that hinged entirely 
on the metaphoric frame. If you see Goldman as an adviser (as 
it would be were this a merger or acquisition), you see its 
statements and omissions in a wholly different light than if you 
see Goldman as a bookie.76 In the Senate hearings, it was clear 
 
 72. Steven Pollock, Lecture Two, The Standard Model of Particle Physics, 
in DVD: PARTICLE PHYSICS FOR NON-PHYSICISTS: A TOUR OF THE 
MICROCOSMOS (The Teaching Company 2003). 
 73. ISAAC ASIMOV, FANTASTIC VOYAGE (1966). 
 74. Id. at 177. 
 75. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Unbundling the Bets, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 10736903 (describing Goldman 
Sachs’s role in creating CDOs). 
 76. Goldman helped establish ABACUS, which created a “reference port-
folio” that mimicked, but did not hold, real subprime debt obligation. Jeffrey 
M. Lipshaw, Goldman as Bookie: Inspector Renault Assesses Synthetic CDOs, 
LEGAL PROF. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_ 
profession/2010/04/goldman-as-bookie-shocked-shocked.html. My reaction was 
that this was analogous to the activities of a bookie facilitating action for bet-
tors with different assessments of the outcome, assuming that, like in Las Ve-
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that Senator Levin employed the former frame; Goldman’s ex-
ecutives and defenders took the latter frame.77 As one who also 
saw Goldman’s activity as the metaphoric equivalent of operat-
ing a sports book, I noted at the time that the epigram on the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s complaint should have 
been: “I’m shocked, shocked to find gambling is going on in 
here!”78 
If our concepts of causation can be metaphoric, with many 
different sources for the explanatory mapping, there is no clear 
cut-off between attributing purpose and intention where the ac-
tion is related to human volition (structuring CDOs or regulat-
ing the money supply), on one side, and attributing purpose to 
forces of nature (electrons and antibodies), on the other. If Co-
ra, a scientist, could react to the antibodies by inferring pur-
pose and viciousness, no wonder that people can find the same 
in complex Wall Street gambling, whether or not the underly-
ing metaphors and meanings are really warranted.  
With that brief background in metaphoric framing as ap-
plied to causation, let us proceed to deal with the metaphors 
possibly embedded in the question “did capitalism fail?” 
B. THE ATELIC METAPHOR: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS WAS TO 
CAPITALISM AS THE COMET IN DEEP IMPACT WAS TO EARTH 
It is not remarkable for modern social scientists to ask the 
question “did capitalism fail?” with an atelic meaning implicit 
in the verb construction. As noted, we want to remove teleology 
from scientific language, even if the teleology seems to persist. 
Yet our veneer of dispassionate and atelic scientism crumbles 
in the face of catastrophe.  
Did capitalism fail? If not, it certainly quaked, but that was 
not the real issue. We would naturally expect that deepwater 
oil wells might break, but it would surprise us if the operators 
of those wells seemed to have no clue how to fix the problem. 
Similarly, we are used to even large businesses falling victim to 
the creative destruction of capitalism,79 but this crisis was sys-
 
gas, bookmaking is legal. Id.; see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Deals on 
Wall Street Resemble a Casino Wager, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at B1, avail-
able at 2010 WLNR 8128042. Not everyone agrees with the metaphor. 
 77. Shahien Nasiripour, Goldman Sachs Hearings: Live Updates, Video, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2010, 1:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/04/27/goldman-sachs-hearings-li_n_553318.html. 
 78. Lipshaw, supra note 76. 
 79. See POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 132–33 (arguing that while the 
bankruptcies of General Motors and Chrysler might have been a short-term 
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temic. What surprised us was not just that the subprime crisis 
brought down Bear, Lehman, and AIG, but that it seemed to 
have surprised the professionals to whom we, as a modern so-
ciety, came to cede matters of scientific complexity, those re-
quiring specialized expertise beyond mere common sense. If 
otherwise thoughtful people believed that models and algo-
rithms gave us the ability not only to understand complex fi-
nancial markets but to control and even eliminate the risk of 
economic disaster, then they were as mistaken as Enlighten-
ment intellectuals who thought, after Newton, that under-
standing physics meant that we could control and even elimi-
nate the risk of physical disaster like earthquakes. In other 
words, this kind of crisis of knowledge has happened before, 
and in a world that, to our present-day eyes, was far less com-
plex than our own. 
What made the financial crisis of 2008–2009 so shocking 
was not just the tumbling of the markets and the freezing up of 
credit. Instead, the crisis for many thoughtful people was as 
much one of coming to terms with the limits of, or overconfi-
dence about, how well financial market participants and regu-
lators knew their business.80 Over the last hundred years or so, 
we have put more and more of our lives and fortunes into the 
hands of professionals, and relied on their specialized know-
ledge to keep us healthy (doctors), productive (information 
technologists), safe (government regulators), and financially se-
cure (brokers, investment advisers, insurance agents, etc). In a 
nutshell, the epistemological crisis (rather than the financial 
crisis) was a crisis in confidence when it turned out that an en-
tire cadre of professionals—mortgage brokers, credit rating 
agencies, investment bankers, fund managers, and financial 
regulators—did not seem to know what they were supposed to 
know about cause and effect in financial markets. Indeed, the 
financial crisis was as much a “crisis of knowledge,” in which 
most of us went from being blissfully ignorant (not knowing 
what we did not know) about things like collateral debt obliga-
tions and credit default swaps to wondering about how we 
could avoid this kind of bubble expansion and bursting in the 
future (now knowing enough to worry but not enough to be able 
to solve the problems). 
 
shocker and there would have been significant dislocations, the failure would 
not have had a significant long-term macroeconomic effect). 
 80. See Lipshaw, supra note 1, at 2–9. 
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The professionals did not know what to do. In this context, 
the atelic meaning of the question “did capitalism fail?” evokes 
powerlessness and fear, in the sense that there are forces with-
out purpose, merely random, like earthquakes and tsunamis, 
which are indeed beyond our control. A piece of popular culture, 
Mimi Leder’s film Deep Impact,81 explored precisely that power-
lessness and fear by way of not-so-fanciful science fiction: a 
comet is going to hit Earth, causing an extinction-level event, 
and preventing the disaster is likely beyond the limits of hu-
man intervention. What I thought was particularly effective in 
the film was that nothing worked, and we sink deeper and 
deeper into hopelessness with each successive failure. First, it 
turns out that the government has been aware of the problem, 
and has outfitted a ship (the Messiah) and highly trained crew 
to destroy the comet. Despite all the planning and training, a 
drill bit gets stuck and cannot place the explosives at the cor-
rect depth. As a result, the blast simply breaks the comet into 
two pieces, one of which is still big enough to wipe out all life. 
The ensuing plan to save a core of humanity in deep caves 
turns out to be a social disaster. Nevertheless, there is still 
hope in a last attempt, as the comet closes in on Earth, to de-
flect it with a barrage of missiles. That too fails. Finally, Presi-
dent Morgan Freeman, now in a sweater rather than a suit, 
announces that all life on Earth is to be wiped out with this co-
da: “So that’s it. Good luck to us all.” My reaction to the film 
was that it likely understated the extent to which such an 
event would strip away the veneer of modernity, and provoke 
panic, desperation, violence, and insanity.  
Have I overstated this? Probably. But the Dow sinking to 
something close to 6000 was about as close as I have ever come 
to thinking about my own personal extinction-level events. Few 
readers of this Article, I suspect, would welcome the rejection of 
economic, sociological, or other social scientific analysis of the 
financial crisis in favor of the explanation historically invoked 
to find purpose in what otherwise seems purposeless: “It was 
God’s will.” We are rational enough not to blame the comet. But 
when the experts who were supposed to have been able to pre-
dict things like comets hurtling toward us are at sea them-
selves, it does not take long for the telos to return in the form of 
the purposiveness of gods and demons, whether human or di-
vine.82 
 
 81. DEEP IMPACT (Paramount Pictures 1998). 
 82. CBS Moneywatch interviewed Peter L. Bernstein, one of the gurus of 
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C. THE TELIC METAPHOR: CAPITALISM WAS TO PROSPERITY AS 
THE ASSEMBLY LINE WAS TO PRODUCTIVITY 
Did capitalism fail us? The transitive construction (and tel-
ic implication) is a little odd. It is hard to talk even about ab-
stract social systems without invoking the language of purpose: 
even to someone as ardently anti-metaphysical as Judge Pos-
ner, mixed capitalism (i.e., private incentives along with laws, 
regulations, and institutions for enforcing them) has “the goal 
of achieving widespread prosperity.”83 There are two ways to 
approach the possibilities of telic meaning in the transitive 
verb construction. The first is to find real human purpose. Even 
if we are not prepared to ascribe the workings of the invisible 
hand to the purposes of actual gods and demons, it is no great 
leap to contend that those in charge of regulating financial 
products and making markets in the modern form of capitalism 
failed us.84 Judge Posner notes, “[I]f the regulatory framework 
is defective, it must be changed, because competition will not 
permit businessmen to subordinate profit maximization to con-
cern for the welfare of society as a whole, and ethics can’t take 
the place of regulation.”85  
Who are “they” and what did they do wrong? When one is 
participating in and regulating financial markets, professional 
judgments are more like scientific judgments than legal judg-
ments. They involve understanding social systems, being able 
to propose predictive and testable hypotheses about how the 
systems work, and the effects regulatory intervention would 
cause. It is one thing to observe a physical system as an outsid-
er; it is another to be a participant in the system and to say, for 
example, as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that this in-
flation in asset values is now a bubble and it is time to admin-
 
financial risk and uncertainty, in March 2009 and posed the question, “So 
many experts steered us wrong. Who can we trust?” He answered:  
I sure as hell don’t know. This is an experience that has no precedent, 
so nobody is very smart on this occasion. I’m old enough to have lived 
through the Depression. The Depression was caused by and magnified 
by things entirely different. The Depression has very little to teach 
us. We’re really flying blind. 
Jeffrey Nash, Peter Bernstein: “Always Ask Yourself: What if I’m Wrong?,” 
MONEYWATCH, Mar. 9, 2009, http://moneywatch.bnet.com/investing/article/peter 
-bernstein--always-ask-what-if-im-wrong/277141/. 
 83. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 2. 
 84. Miller, supra note 1, at 113 (“[Parceling out] moral blame to regulators, 
Wall Street financiers, loan originators and securitizers, auditors, rating agen-
cies, and consumers” is a pious-sounding story bearing little relation to reality). 
 85. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 2. 
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ister some corrective medicine. Once a catastrophe has oc-
curred, the natural lawyerly impulse is to assign blame, be-
cause the retroactive assignment of blame, in the ordinary con-
ception, is what lawyers do. I find that impulse unhelpful, 
believing as I do that the crisis has been as much epistemologi-
cal as financial. My answer to the epistemological aspect of the 
crisis is to separate out the blame game of hindsight bias, con-
front what we know and do not know, decide what our goals are 
(for example, if you hedge against busts, you give up a lot of the 
fun on the ride up the bubble), and not fall victim to the faith 
that algorithms rather than continuing application of good (not 
perfect) judgment solve any of our problems.86 
The other approach to the telic meaning of the question is 
to understand the persistence of teleology in science. Even 
when our scientific minds tell us there is no purpose, and the 
universe is no more than a system operating deterministically 
or probabilistically under the laws of classical and/or quantum 
physics, the idea of a wholly atelic universe does not come easi-
ly. Shakespeare captured the ultimate animation of nature 
when he wrote, “[A]s flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods. 
They kill us for their sport.”87 It reflects the human unwilling-
ness to accept that nature is truly either random or determinis-
tic, but the insistence instead on the intentionality of the gods. 
Even randomness in nature, the bad fortune that seems to be-
fall us for no reason, has a reason, even if it is nothing more 
than the gods deciding they have the purpose of playing games 
of chance for their own entertainment.  
Thus, the intellectual history of science has been in large 
part the replacement of telic cause with atelic cause (the tradi-
tional view that Johnson criticized).88 Aristotle’s “final cause” 
was the concept that change occurs, even in nature, “for the 
sake of something.”89 When we perceive systems in nature, we 
presume an order beyond mere chance, such that it does not 
matter whether there really was a “designer,” because when 
something works, it seems intuitive to be to an end or purpose, 
like a house to shelter us, or our incisors and molars appropri-
ate to tear and grind our food: 
[W]hen an event takes place always or for the most part, it is not in-
cidental or by chance . . . . It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not 
 
 86. See Lipshaw, supra note 1, at 312–34.  
 87. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 4, sc. 1. 
 88. Johnson, supra note 56, at 40. 
 89. See Aristotle on Causality, supra note 5. 
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present because we do not observe the agent deliberating. . . . It is 
plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a pur-
pose.90 
The ultimate in atelic causation was Hume’s concept of 
causation as the mere perception of constant conjunction,91 the 
antithesis of the purposiveness called out by Shakespeare and 
his character Gloucester.92 Even after the Enlightenment, as 
secular philosophers and scientists came to view the processes 
of nature as something wholly apart from moral desert, teleolo-
gy persisted, particularly in the social sciences.93 It is simply 
silly to think that the toilet ballcock system has human-like 
ends or purposes to stop water flow, even if the function or pur-
pose of the system is to do exactly that. As Professor Stephen 
Turner observed, even in the context of social systems, unless 
we are willing to accept a group mind or collective intelligence, 
“end-seeking is a property that adds no explanatory content—
everything that happens does so because of the arrangement of 
causal mechanisms such as the feedback mechanisms that do 
the work of directing the system toward the end state.”94  
But teleology still persists. Professor Turner asks, “To 
what extent are [social institutions] ‘real,’ or, put differently, do 
they possess any explanatory force beyond the elements of hu-
man action and physical causality that compose them?”95 His 
speculations on the reasons for the persistence of teleology re-
turn, in a way, to Pinker’s (or the Lakoff and Johnson) thesis: 
even attempts to state teleological terms in nonteleological lan-
guage seem to fail. He cites Ernest Nagel’s attempt to restate 
teleological statement <1> into purportedly nonteleological 
statement <2>: 
 
<1> “The function of the leucocytes in human blood is to defend the 
body against foreign micro-organisms.”96 
 
 90. Aristotle, Physics, Book II, § 8, in THE PORTABLE GREEK READER 406, 
428–29 (W.H. Auden ed., 1948). 
 91. Turner & Roth, supra note 33, at 12. 
 92. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 87. 
 93. See Stephen P. Turner, Cause, the Persistence of Teleology, and the 
Origins of the Philosophy of Social Science, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 33, at 21, 30. 
 94. Id. at 35. 
 95. Id. at 34. 
 96. Id. at 36 (quoting ERNEST NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE: 
PROBLEMS IN THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 405 (1961)). 
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<2> “Unless human blood contains a sufficient number of leucocytes, 
certain normal activities of the body are impaired.”97 
 
Victor Gourevitch’s response was that statement <2>, in its 
use of sufficient, normal, and impaired, presupposed the func-
tion or purpose of a healthy blood system. Indeed, “the only real 
difference between [the] two statements is that the so-called 
nonteleological statement takes for granted what the teleologi-
cal statement renders explicit.”98 
Thus, the question “did capitalism fail?,” at least in the 
transitive verb usage, implies that it has a purpose. One way to 
deal with teleology is to be more specific about identifying 
mechanisms, as in neoclassical economics, by understanding 
that there is not really an “invisible hand,” but that the refer-
ence is a shorthand way of (or a useful metaphor in) aggregat-
ing individual actions into a systemic tendency to reach (or, 
even more teleologically, seek) equilibrium.99 It is one thing to 
ask if capitalism died or is dying (intransitively), and if so, fig-
ure out how to correct it. The danger of the persistence of tele-
ology is when “other collective concepts used as explanations 
seem to be wholly analogical and incapable of being broken 
down into plausible mechanisms.”100  
The problem lies in the framing metaphor that serves as 
the persistent teleology: “Capitalism is a machine that serves to 
make us prosperous.” If we liken capitalism to a human body 
that had a stroke, and some of its metaphorical limbs were left 
paralyzed, maybe there are some medicines we could prescribe 
to restore the limbs to good use and some therapies we could 
adopt to avoid future strokes. Sometimes that works and some-
times it does not. But if we liken capitalism to a machine de-
signed (or whose function is) to produce prosperity, then it 
must have broken for a reason we should be able to under-
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (quoting Victor Gourevitch, Philosophy and Politics, II, 22 REV. 
METAPHYSICS 281, 293 n.107 (1968)). Robert Miller has suggested to me that 
there is more of a principled difference between the “purposes” of an agent and 
the “functions” of a thing or system than I have credited here. See, e.g., Fran-
cis Slade, Ends and Purposes, in FINAL CAUSALITY IN NATURE AND HUMAN 
AFFAIRS 83, 83–85 (Richard F. Hassing ed., 1997). To a large extent, the very 
debate supports my point. Turner addresses this explicitly in the referenced 
discussion: “Whether functional arguments avoid the traditional difficulties of 
teleology is controversial.” Turner, supra note 93, at 35 (emphasis added). 
 99. Turner, supra note 93, at 38. 
 100. Id. 
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stand, we should be able to fix it, and we should feel confident 
that future breakages will not occur.  
James Champy’s description of the business manager’s or-
deal is a profound assessment of the operative metaphor of the 
machine, and is equally applicable to the ordeal of the regulato-
ry manager.101 Alfred Sloan envisioned and created “a man-
agement machine, a way to build not just cars, but an entire 
company.”102 The metaphor had great appeal: the company was 
a cruise ship that, correctly managed, “should operate with per-
fect reliability and rationality.”103 The problem was that the 
metaphor, a product of the 1920s, lost its explanatory power in 
the competitive seas of the 1980s and 1990s. Champy proposed 
a different metaphor (while acknowledging the danger of using 
any metaphor): managing a company was more like sailing a 
boat “because there are so many factors—the wind, the tide, 
the weather—sailors have no control or command over.”104  
The metaphor of the machine feeds the persistence of what 
we would have thought was benign teleology—that there is an 
order in the physical and social worlds and so we are capable of 
reducing explanation to a set of laws. The hubris of the finan-
cial engineers at AIG and elsewhere now blamed for the mess 
and Judge Posner’s criticism of them, and the economists who 
were supposed to understand their activities and the regulators 
who were to limit them, are merely opposite sides of the same 
coin.105 It turns out that there is no algorithm for an incessant-
ly upward financial return (and if you see such a return over a 
long period there must be something fishy going on). To be 
sure, the great merit in identifying causal mechanisms for the 
purpose of avoiding similar mistakes in the future is beyond 
argument (though the pessimist in me believes that we will, 
like the generals, be fighting the last war when the new crisis, 
whatever it is, arrives). The problem is that any teleology of the 
financial crisis seems to slip quickly from helpful explanatory 
metaphor to the very real ascription of purposes to gods or de-
mons. 
 
 101. JAMES CHAMPY, REENGINEERING MANAGEMENT (1995). 
 102. Sloan was a founder of General Motors. Id. at 13. 
 103. Id. at 14. 
 104. Id. at 32. 
 105. See POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 339–52. 
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D. TÖNNIES AND THE PERSISTENCE OF METAPHORIC 
AMBIVALENCE 
The question then is: Why such slippage? My thesis is that 
questions like “did capitalism fail?” belong to a tradition of pos-
iting grand theories of the movement of history, and there is 
not that much difference between the construction of explana-
tory metaphors as between science, on one hand, and gods or 
demons, on the other.  
One example of such a grand theory was Ferdinand 
Tönnies’s attempt to reconcile traditional communities of belief 
with the impersonal structures of modern life in his seminal 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Civil Society), 
originally published in 1887 and updated through 1935.106 Ge-
meinschaft is the model of rural or village life, “based essential-
ly on concord, on the fundamental harmony of wills, and is de-
veloped and cultivated by religion and custom.”107 Gesellschaft 
is the model of modern urbanized institutions, “based on con-
vention, on a convergence or pooling of rational desires; it is 
guaranteed and protected by political legislation, while its poli-
cies and their ratification are derived from public opinion.”108 
In Tönnies’s time, the equivalent question to “did capitalism 
fail?” was “have modern social organizations of like capitalism 
[Gesellschaft] left community [Gemeinschaft] in the dust?”109 
Two things are significant about a look back at Tönnies. 
First, it illustrates the influence of metaphoric frames, for bet-
ter or worse, on grand sociological questions. If, as the meta-
phor theorists assert, the essence of thought is developing 
meanings out of “mental constructions involving many spaces 
and many mappings in elaborate integration networks,”110 it 
comes as no surprise Tönnies can construct, and readers can in-
terpret, a conceptualization of social organization that is at 
once static and dynamic. For example, Fauconnier and Turner 
demonstrate the complex meanings that can arise by way of 
 
 106. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY app. at 247–61 
(Jose Harris ed., Jose Harris & Margaret Hollis trans., 2001) (1887). Its Eng-
lish editor described it variously as “precocious immaturity,” “immensely am-
bitious,” and “steeped in erudition,” but “nevertheless frequently tortuous and 
obscure in the exposition and knitting together of its central arguments.” Jose 
Harris, General Introduction to COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY, supra, at ix, xv. 
 107. TÖNNIES, supra note 106, app. at 247. 
 108. Harris, supra note 106, at ix, xv. 
 109. TÖNNIES, supra note 106, app. at 247.  
 110. Gilles Fauconnier & Mark Turner, Rethinking Metaphor, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF METAPHOR AND THOUGHT, supra note 53, at 53, 53. 
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conceptual integration from the fundamental metaphor “time is 
space:”111 
 
<3> Three hours went by and then he had dinner. 
<4> Minutes are quick but hours are slow. 
<5> Those three hours went by slowly for me, but the same three 
hours went by quickly for him. 
 
This is not pure metaphor or analogy, but conceptual inte-
gration to create meaning. Statement <3> involves not only 
projecting the order of space by units to time, but also making 
those units into moving objects. But in space, units of meas-
urement do not move. Moreover, if “time” as an object moves, 
then its units ought to move at the same speed, but the allusion 
in statement <4> suggests they do not. Statement <5> adds the 
projection of a subjective perception of the moving objects such 
that we are able to imagine “fast” hours and “slow” hours; that 
is, even the individual units that move at the same speed may 
appear not to do so.112  
Tönnies’s dichotomies are steeped in metaphors and inte-
grations far more complex than “time is space” or even “min-
utes flowed like hours.” While both presume peaceful communi-
ties, Tönnies’s metaphor for Gemeinschaft is “a living organism 
in its own right”; Gesellschaft is a “mechanical aggregate and 
artefact.”113 Moreover, there is a metaphor of movement: the 
“entire development [of Gemeinschaft] involves progression to-
ward market [Gesellschaft].”114 The essential debate about the 
work has been the following: does it mean to say, as a historical 
progression, urban society left village communities in the dust, 
or is it an assessment of sociological archetypes that have al-
ways coexisted, albeit more or less at any given time? “Tönnies 
was consistently to maintain that the dichotomies he had iden-
tified were not time-specific or mutually exclusive, and that 
contrasting types of institution—and contrasting attributes 
within a single institution—would always co-exist in any his-
torical setting.”115  
Nevertheless, it appears (legitimately, and readers have so 
interpreted it) to be an assertion of the historical reality of un-
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 54–55. 
 113. TÖNNIES, supra note 106, at 19.  
 114. Id. app. at 258. 
 115. Harris, supra note 106, at xxviii. 
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ambiguous movement from one end to the other of the concep-
tual polarity.116 The traditional culture of community, or Ge-
meinschaft, “despite many outward trappings of continuity,” 
was being “swept away by the rise of mass marketing, limited 
liability, and large-scale business corporations,” or Gesell-
schaft.117 The lesson from this reading is that framing meta-
phors projecting from “time is space,” such as “history is a jour-
ney through time,” are so powerful that authors themselves 
may either intend them or be unable to keep readers from in-
ferring them. I simply do not know (nor, I suspect, do the orga-
nizers of the symposium) whether the underlying metaphor in 
“did capitalism fail?” is atelic, as capitalism failing in the natu-
ral evolution of things, or telic, as in either the machine, the 
gods, or the demons failed us. 
There is, however, a second, more positive, point to take 
from Tönnies. If we take him at his word, he is telling us we 
were capable then, individually and as a society, of being si-
multaneously premodern and modern. I see no reason to think 
that has changed in a mere hundred years. The metaphor of 
gods and demons making history, on one hand, and the meta-
phor of capitalism as a fixable machine, on the other, each stem 
from the same cognitive source and each is, in its own way, a 
caricature. Fauconnier and Turner tell us that what might 
seem to be a naïve projection of an invisible hand is, cognitively 
speaking, a highly elaborate cognitive integration. “One stand-
ard conceptual technique is to project agency into the occur-
rence of events,” and the agents can be abstractions like time 
as in “[t]ime marches on” or “[t]ime waits for no man.”118 And in 
his criticism of the traditional philosophical view that causa-
tion is an objective fact of the physical universe rather than a 
set of metaphoric mappings from the human experience of 
physical relationships, Johnson observes that “there is no way 
to avoid the use of one or another basic causal metaphor in 
science,” as much as we might think good scientific explana-
tions should not employ metaphor at all.119 
The teleological metaphor is alternatively machines, gods, 
or demons, and the latter two can be human or divine. The met-
 
 116. Indeed, Emile Durkheim himself read the text not as an analytic 
framework for understanding social organization, but as the description of a 
“historical shift from a ‘solidarist’ past to a ‘mechanistic’ future.” Id. at xxix. 
 117. Id. at xiv. 
 118. Fauconnier & Turner, supra note 110, at 61–62. 
 119. Johnson, supra note 56, at 42. 
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aphor of the machine is that capitalism is a system designed to 
make us prosperous, and one that we can tinker with and per-
fect. The alternative metaphor is that we can lay the blame for 
booms, bubbles, and busts at gods, demons, Wall Street bank-
ers, or the Federal Reserve. Each seems to me as much a cari-
cature of reality as the other. As much as we try to control un-
certainty, some residual amount is, by the nature of things, 
going to remain a mystery beyond our understanding. As Peter 
Bernstein observed in his seminal book on risk, we try “to com-
prehend nature’s tendency to repeat itself, but only imperfect-
ly.”120 He too links gods and machines, and their succession in 
time as though Gemeinschaft yielding to Gesellschaft: “Those 
who live only by the numbers may find that the computer has 
simply replaced the oracles to whom people resorted in ancient 
times for guidance in risk management and decision-
making.”121 Even the most sophisticated decisionmaking mod-
els rely on a leap of faith: that in the relevant respect, the fu-
ture will resemble the past. Bernstein turns to the novelist 
G.K. Chesterton for the proposition that life “‘looks just a little 
more mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is ob-
vious, but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in 
wait.’”122 And hindsight is always twenty-twenty: “After the 
fact . . . the source of the wildness appears to be so obvious to 
us that we have a hard time understanding how people on the 
scene were oblivious to what lay in wait for them.”123 
This is no appeal to quietism or inaction. Moreover, in the 
course of taking action, there is great value in asking a ques-
tion like “did capitalism fail?” If we cannot avoid metaphor in 
the complex conceptual integrations that constitute our percep-
tions of causation, then we can at least be reflective about the 
metaphors themselves. The great value of teleology in thinking 
about the financial crisis is Bernstein’s more moderate view: 
 
 120. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF 
RISK 329 (1998). Note that in 1998, Bernstein identified counterparty solvency 
on financial derivatives as the key systemic risk and, in a poignant example of 
uncertainty, cautioned against overregulating, noting that “there is only a fine 
line between guaranteeing absolute safety and stifling the development of fi-
nancial innovations that, properly handled, could reduce the volatility of cor-
porate cash flows.” Id. at 325–28. For an interview with Bernstein after the 
onset of the current crisis (and shortly before Bernstein passed away), see 
Nash, supra note 82. 
 121. BERNSTEIN, supra note 120, at 336. 
 122. Id. at 331 (quoting GILBERT KEITH CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 148– 
50 (1909)). 
 123. Id. at 334. 
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even if cause and effect itself remains elusive, there is suffi-
cient order and predictability in human affairs that abstract 
social sciences like economics and concrete disciplines like in-
surance and risk management work. If we have a systemic dis-
ease, then we need to do the diagnostics and prescribe the ap-
propriate regulatory medicine.124 I am no expert, but at least 
some prescriptions about the kinds of systemic risk that pro-
voke these questions come to mind: (a) either sweeping the 
high-risk shadow banking system into banking regulation 
(which seems unduly conservative because there ought to be a 
place for such activity) or limiting the amount of leverage that 
commercial banks may undertake by separating that activity 
from more speculative banking (the point of Glass-Steagall);125 
and (b) addressing the fact that systemic risk is not merely a 
banking problem by providing for a liquidity lender of last 
resort as proposed by Steven Schwarcz.126  
Nevertheless, walking the line between the metaphors of 
machines and demons is not easy, and commentators as astute 
as Judge Posner can get a mediocre grade. Even though he cor-
rectly observes with Bernstein that risk is simply that aspect of 
uncertainty we have come to systematize in a reliable way,127 
nevertheless he seems unwilling to accept, with Bernstein, that 
some part of the wildness will always wait. The metaphor of 
the machine dies hard. Uncertainty by definition constitutes 
the universe of those predictions for which there is no algo-
rithm. Yet Judge Posner clings to the tautology that an algo-
rithm or a function can somehow model (and therefore control) 
the effect of uncertainty, expressing uncertainty aversion in-
stead as a function of the time and cost it takes to gain infor-
 
 124. Steven L. Schwarcz, perhaps the leading legal commentator on sys-
temic risk, identifies the kind of event that induces questions like “did capital-
ism fail?”—widespread panic that induces systemic collapse. Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 193 (2008). The ultimate goal of 
law and regulation is to reduce the likelihood of such panic. This is, of course, 
easier said than done. As Professor Schwarcz observes, “[a]ny regulation 
aimed at preventing panics that trigger systemic risk, however, could fail to 
anticipate all the causes of these panics.” Id. at 214–16.  
 125. For an overview of this kind of reform, see POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 
2, at 353–60. As to reducing leverage generally, see Schwarcz, supra note 124, 
at 223–24. I note that Judge Posner and I share “disease metaphors” on this 
point. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 166. 
 126. Schwarcz, supra note 124, at 225–30, 241–43. Claire Hill also summa-
rizes prudent regulatory moves that get at causes rather than the attribution 
of blame. Hill, supra note 4, at 346–49. 
 127. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 289–90. 
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mation, and linking uncertainty aversion to liquidity prefer-
ences that are the proximate cause of systemic credit freezes.128  
Alternatively, the metaphor of demons also dies hard, even 
if Judge Posner’s well-taken point is that reform ought to be 
“serious, neutral, [and] patient.”129 Judge Posner himself finds 
no shortage of people and institutions at which we may point 
fingers (the Federal Reserve Chairman, economists, credit rat-
ing agencies, and government-sponsored entities like Fannie 
Mae). Judge Posner says that a realist view of human rationali-
ty “acknowledges the role of irreducible uncertainty in decision 
making.”130 If so, even what appear in hindsight to be mis-
judgments by the regulators need to be opportunities for learn-
ing rather than opprobrium. I am afraid that the distinction be-
tween political and disinterested blaming (the kind Judge 
Posner claims to provide) is far too subtle to overcome the de-
monic metaphor.131 Given my thesis about the attribution of 
agency even to events that are not agents, it is not hard to see 
how disinterested attribution of cause morphs into political 
blaming. It is only a small move from “you caused this conse-
quence” to “you are to blame for this consequence.” The former 
is likely affected by hindsight bias, and the latter may be moti-
vated by ideology, but both still have to do with finding fault.132 
 
 128. See id. at 295–96.  
 129. Id. at 362. 
 130. Id. at 31. 
 131. Id. at 250–51.  
 132. Judge Posner’s discussion of causation and hindsight bias highlights 
the same difficulties of scientific or philosophical causation, on one hand, and 
legal causation, on the other, that I discussed in Lipshaw, supra note 1, at 
312–34. Judge Posner’s thesis is that experts like Alan Greenspan and Ben 
Bernanke made errors in professional judgment—namely, in failing to antic-
ipate consequences from extant conditions. POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 5. 
Such are inductive judgments, common in science, that require the identifica-
tion of a past regularity, the rule for which can be used as a hypothesis to pre-
dict future results.  
Judge Posner is correct in stating that hindsight bias is an after-the-fact 
confusion of actual with perceived probability, the event having actually oc-
curred. Id. at 259. As a result of hindsight bias, people so affected “believe that 
they, and others, should have been able to anticipate the event and they even 
‘misremember their own predictions so as to exaggerate in hindsight what 
they knew in foresight.’” Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availa-
bility Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct 
Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103, 112 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (quoting B. 
Fischoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES 428 (D. Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). But the effect of hindsight bias 
may not just be confusion; as Judge Posner puts it pithily, hindsight bias is “a 
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  CONCLUSION   
I am wholly incapable of answering the question of wheth-
er capitalism failed. In this Article, I have instead probed the 
syntax and semantics of the question itself to see if they pro-
vide insight into the meaning that modern and intelligent hu-
man beings draw from catastrophes like the financial crisis. 
The question does indeed reflect ambivalence about purposes 
and ends, the telos, in the physical and social worlds. Using 
Pinker’s insights into language, I conclude that the verb con-
struction of the question is ambiguous (being patently intransi-
tive but latently transitive).  
Moreover, each possible verb construction leads us to a dif-
ferent kind of explanatory metaphor about cause and effect in 
the financial crisis. The intransitive verb construction evokes 
an atelic metaphor in which capitalism is a machine that failed 
(in the sense that it got sick) and simply needed to be fixed. The 
lesson in that case is the fragility of the metaphor that appears 
when it turned out that the doctors appeared not to know how 
to cure the patient. The transitive verb construction evokes a 
telic metaphor in which something or someone failed us, and 
we need to blame an agency, whether it turns out to be human, 
god, or demon. 
Finally, asking questions like “did capitalism fail?” is in-
deed helpful if they cause us to question the metaphors. The 
persistence of teleology and the metaphors by which we derive 
meaning, it seems to me, are aspects of the human condition, 
and neither good nor bad.133 They morph easily, however, into 
the finger pointing not only of disinterested blame, but also of 
 
potent source of unjust blame.” POSNER, CRISIS, supra note 2, at 196.  
Thus, even disinterested hindsight bias is still bias and therefore suspect. 
See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining 
Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 90 (1995) (“[T]he possibility 
that the hindsight bias may make precautions that seem reasonable in fore-
sight look inadequate in hindsight.”); Susan J. Labine & Gary Labine, Deter-
minations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 
504–05 (1996) (“[T]he outcome . . . would significantly influence the decision 
about the reasonableness of the . . . actions.”). I have no brief to defend Alan 
Greenspan or Ben Bernanke, but Judge Posner’s book did not persuade me 
that their decisions were blamably misguided or unreasonable as opposed to 
being merely wrong in retrospect. Yet it is hard not to draw the conclusion 
that Judge Posner finds their decisions culpable as measured by some stand-
ard of care, even if not a legal one. 
 133. Robert T. Miller notes in precisely this context: “[I]t takes a philosoph-
ical temperament to survey the limits of the human condition and nod at them 
ironically.” Miller, supra note 1, at 137. 
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political recrimination. My objective is not some unobtainable 
dispassion, only a more reflective and measured assessment of 
cause and effect. 
